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Security of the infrastructure of Software Defined Net-
works (SDN) is a challenging problem. SDN introduces
new threat vectors in addition to those inherited from
legacy networks. Thus, it becomes an attractive target
for attackers. SDN separates the control and data planes,
and migrates the control functions to a logically central-
ized entity called controller which might be an attrac-
tive target for Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. These attacks can be
executed easily using open access tools and without re-
quiring specialized or high performance hardware. Ac-
cording to the literature, the protection of the SDN in-
frastructure, specially against this kind of threats has
not been widely addressed. Thus, we propose an al-
gorithm to detect DDoS attacks against SDN control
plane. Our algorithm considers both the OpenFlow traf-
fic towards the control plane and specific interfaces of
OpenFlow switches (local perspective detection) or the
whole agreggated OpenFlow traffic on the control chan-
nel (global perspective detection). In our evaluation, we
achieved a 99.94% of accuracy in detecting attacks with
a 0.04% of false positives and 0.07% of false negatives.
Keywords: SDN, OpenFlow, DDoS, SPRT, Control plane.
4
Abstract
La seguridad de la infraestructura de las Redes Definidas
por Software (SDN por sus siglas en inglés) es un prob-
lema dif́ıcil. SDN introduce nuevos vectores de amenaza
adicionales a aquellos heredados de las redes tradicionales.
SDN se convierte entonces en un objetivo atractivo para
los atacantes. SDN separa el plano de control y el plano
de datos, y de manera que las funciones de control se mi-
gran a una entidad centralizada desde el punto de vista
lógico, llamada controlador el cual puede ser un obje-
tivo atractivo para ataques de Denegación de Servicios
(DoS) y de Denegación de Servicio Distribuidos (DDoS).
Estos ataques pueden ser ejecutados fácilmente usando
herramientas de acceso libre y sin requerir hardware es-
pecializado o de alto rendimiento. Según la literatura,
la protección de la infraestructura SDN, especialmente
contra este tipo de amenazas no ha sido abordada ampli-
amente. Proponemos un algoritmo para detectar ataques
DDoS contra el plano de control SDN. Nuestro algoritmo
considera el tráfico que pasa entre el plano de control y
las interfaces especificas de los suiches OpenFlow (per-
spectiva local de detección) y todo el tráfico OpenFlow
agregado en el canal de control (perspectiva global de de-
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tección). En nuestra evaluación, logramos un 99.94% de
precisión en la detección de los ataques con un 0.04% de
falsos positivos (eventos que no corresponden a ataques)
y un 0.07% de falsos negativos (eventos de ataques que
fueron ignorados).
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Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a network architecture based on three main prin-
ciples: (i) separation of control and data planes, (ii) logical centralization of the control
operations and unified view of the network state, and (iii) programmability of the network
through applications running on the control plane. The combination of these principles and
the advantages that they introduce allow to overcome difficulties typically associated to some
management tasks on legacy networks such as configuration of complex routing and security
policies [Benson et al., 2009].
SDN uses a standardized protocol to program devices, which as anecdotal evidence suggests,
it is most widely implemented by OpenFlow-compliant agents in switches [McKeown et al., 2008].
OpenFlow standardizes the communication between the control plane (controller) and the
data plane (forwarding devices). The main function of OpenFlow is to program the flow
tables of the forwarding devices according to high level network policies defined by network
operators [Xia et al., 2015]. Leveraging the principles of the SDN architecture and partic-
ularly features of OpenFlow such as the flow-oriented traffic management, novel solutions
can be developed in areas such as traffic engineering, wireless and mobility, monitoring,
datacenter networks, and security [Kreutz et al., 2015].
1.1 Motivation
A scenario where SDN can provide innovative solutions is network security. The literature re-
ports different use cases such as intrusion detection systems (IDSs) [Shanmugam et al., 2014]
[Hu et al., 2013], intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) [Giotis et al., 2014] [Xing et al., 2013],
and DDoS attack detection [Zargar and Joshi, 2013] [Li et al., 2014] [Dotcenko et al., 2014]
[Braga et al., 2010]. Despite the interest in using SDN to offer solutions in this area, the secu-
rity of the SDN infrastructure itself has not been widely addressed [Scott-Hayward et al., 2016].
The ability to control the network through software and the logical centralization of the net-
work control introduce new threat vectors and vulnerabilities causing the SDN infrastructure
to become an attractive target for attackers [Kreutz et al., 2013] [Benton et al., 2013]. The
most critical threat vectors and vulnerabilities are those that enable DDoS attacks against
the control plane because these attacks could render unavailable large segments or even the
entire network [Yan et al., 2015] [Benton et al., 2013].
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1.2 Hypothesis and research questions
DDoS attacks against SDN control plane are difficult to detect using traditional DDoS de-
fense mechanisms because these attacks have some specific features [Dong et al., 2016]. First,
it is difficult to detect malicious flows using OpenFlow devices. The OpenFlow devices do
not have intelligence to differenciate flows because they only have forwarding functionalities.
Second, the traffic of DDoS attacks is directed to the SDN control plane. These attacks have
a similar behavior to the one exhibited by reflection-based flooding attacks. These features
make the problem DDoS attack detection in the context of SDN hard [Zargar et al., 2013]. In
addition, DoS or DDoS attacks against the control plane, specifically against the controller,
might be executed by an attacker using easily accessible tools and they do not require spe-
cialized or high performance hardware [Kandoi and Antikainen, 2015] [Shin and Gu, 2013].
The literature addresses the problem of detect DDoS attacks against SDN control plane.
However, previous proposed methods have some limitations. First, the detection methods
could not detect attacks using low rate traffic. Second, detection and mitigation proposals
are not capable to detect DDoS attacks based on protocols different to TCP.
1.2 Hypothesis and research questions
In the context of detection of DDoS attacks against SDN control plane, this thesis presents
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: It is possible to detect DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane through the
extraction of OpenFlow traffic features by monitoring the traffic between the controller
and OpenFlow switches, in order to detect the attack and if possible, identify the
interfaces where the DDoS attacks come from.
In order to guide the investigation conducted in this thesis, the following research questions
(RQ) associated with the hypothesis are defined and presented:
RQ1: What are the threat vectors and vulnerabilities of the control plane designs that might
be exploited by an attacker to execute DDoS attacks?
RQ2: What is the impact that well-known DoS and DDoS attacks in the context of legacy
networks generate when executed in a network environment based on SDN?
RQ3: Which network anomaly detection techniques can be used in the context of SDN to
detect attacks aiming at achieving the premises of high accuracy, low false positives
rate and minimal overhead during the detection process?
At the end of this study, at least one possible answer for each question is provided. However,




During the development of this thesis, we propose an approach to detect DDoS attacks
against the control plane of SDN. We leverage the logically centralized control to monitor
the OpenFlow traffic looking for abrupt changes in the number of Packet-In messages in
comparison to the number of these messages during normal operation of the network.
Our approach tries to identify the sources of a DDoS attack against SDN control plane.
To achieve this, we monitor the OpenFlow traffic coming from each interface of OpenFlow
devices (local perspective detection). In addition, we complement the per-interface and per-
switch analysis through the monitoring of the aggregated OpenFlow traffic of the control
communication channel (global detection perspective). Furthermore, if local perspective
detection does not detect attacks coming from specific interfaces of the OpenFlow switches
(because the attacker uses low rate traffic), global perspective detection tries to detect low
rate attacks monitoring the OpenFlow traffic of all OpenFlow switches.
1.4 Objectives
1.4.1 General
Design an algorithm to detect DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane by monitoring
the traffic between controller and OpenFlow switches in OpenFlow-based SDN environment,
and if possible identify the interfaces of OpenFlow switches where the DDoS attacks come
from.
1.4.2 Specific
1. Identify specific threat vectors and vulnerabilities of state-of-art control plane designs
that might be target of DDoS attacks.
2. Analyze the impact that well-known DoS and DDoS attacks (reported in the literature
in the context of legacy networks) generate in the SDN control plane.
3. Determine a set of network intrusion detection techniques to perform attack detection,
applicable in the context of SDN and that aim at achieving the premises of high
accuracy, low false positives rate and mininal overhead during the detection process.
4. Specify an algorithm that implements detection of DDoS attacks against SDN control
plane by monitoring OpenFlow traffic in switches interfaces (local perspective detec-





This thesis is outlined as follows: Chapter 2 presents the fundamentals of our work: Software-
Defined networks (SDN), Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack, and threat vectors
and vulnerabilities in SDN. Chapter 3 shows the related-work, research problem, threat
vectors and vulnerabilities in the SDN control plane, analysis of well-known attacks, and
analysis of anomaly detection techniques. Chapter 4 describe the DDoS detection algorithm.
Chapter 5 present the evaluation and results of the thesis. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a
discussion about the results, conclusions and future work.
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2 Background
This chapter presents the fundamental concepts used in our work. This chapter is divided
into three sections: Software-defined networks (SDN), Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
attacks, threat vectors and vulnerabilities in SDN.
2.1 Software-Defined Networks (SDN)
The main motivation for SDN is to accelerate innovation. In legacy networks, the control and
data planes are tighly coupled. As a consequence, the development of new functionality or
network features such as new routing algorithms is a very difficult task. These new function-
alities imply the modification of the control plane devices through the installation of firmware
or even new hardware. The deployment of new functionalities becomes expensive and it is
limited by hardware features. In addition, every change in the network topology, configu-
ration or functionality is very complex and tedious [Kreutz et al., 2015] [Benson et al., 2009].
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a network architecture where network control is de-
coupled from forwarding functionality. SDN is based on three main principles [Kreutz et al., 2015]:
1. Separation of the control and data planes: Control functionality is removed from
the forwarding devices. Thus, they become simple packet forwarding elements with
minimal intelligence embedded within them.
2. Logically centralized control providing a unified view of the topology and
network state to applications: Control logic is migrated to an entity called con-
troller which provides resources and abstractions to facilitate the configuration of the
forwarding devices.
3. Programmability of the network through applications running on the con-
troller: The network becomes programmable through software applications which can
be developed with either general-purpose languages such as Java, Python, and C++
or specific-purpose languages such as Frenetic, Nelttle, Netcore, Procera, and Pyretic.
These SDN principles introduce three fundamental abstractions: Forwarding abstraction,
distribution abstraction, and specification abstraction. Forwarding abstraction enables the
ability to program the forwarding devices, expressing the desired packet forwarding func-
tionality while hiding hardware implementation details. Distribution abstraction changes
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2.1 Software-Defined Networks (SDN)
Figure 2-1: Basic Architecture of SDN [Kreutz et al., 2015]
the network distributed control problem to a centralized one. Finally, specification abstrac-
tion makes it for network applications to express the desired network behavior without being
responsible of their actual implementation in the forwarding devices [Xia et al., 2015].
Compared with legacy networks, SDN architecture has several advantages [Reitblatt et al., 2012]:
1. It is easier to develop network applications due to the offered abstractions (forwarding,
distribution, and specification).
2. Network applications can implement consistent and effective network policies leverag-
ing the logically centralized control (control plane).
3. Network applications use the logical centralization of network control and the unified
view of the network to dynamically change the configuration of the forwarding devices.
4. The logical centralization of the network control and the unified view of the network
state simplify the information sharing among applications. Thus, each application can
leverage information provided by other applications to improve its operation.
2.1.1 Basic Architecture
SDN architecture is shown in Figure 2-1. The SDN architecture is composed by the following
elements:
1. Management plane: The management plane is the set of applications that levarages
the functions offered by the northbound interface and the control plane. The man-
7
2.1 Software-Defined Networks (SDN)
Figure 2-2: Basic architecture of an OpenFlow device [McKeown et al., 2008]
agement plane defines the network policies and remotely monitors and configures the
control functionalities using control stations.
2. Control plane: The control logic operation of the network resides in the control
plane. The control plane translates the high level network policies defined by the
network applications and programs the forwarding devices according to these policies.
In addition, the control plane provides a unified view of the network state to network
applications running on it. The communication between network applications and the
control plane is performed through the northbound interface. This interface abstracts
to the developers the configuration steps necessary to program the forwarding devices
[Kreutz et al., 2015].
3. Data plane: Forwarding devices and the connection between them compose the data
plane. The data plane elements are programmed by the control plane through the
southbound interface. The most common implementation of SDN southbound interface
is the OpenFlow protocol [Xia et al., 2015].
2.1.2 OpenFlow
OpenFlow is the protocol used by the control plane to program the forwarding devices.
Since OpenFlow has gained significant traction in the industry and academic, with no clear
8
2.1 Software-Defined Networks (SDN)
Figure 2-3: Flow table of an OpenFlow device.
competitor as is informally known, we focus on OpenFlow-based SDN architectures in the
remainder of this work.
An OpenFlow device is an element that performs packet forwarding according to the con-
figuration defined from the control plane. Figure 2-2 shows the basic architecture of an
OpenFlow device.
An OpenFlow forwarding device consists of at least three parts [Xia et al., 2015]:
1. The flow table with matching fields, actions and counters. Figure 2-3 shows an example
of a flow table in an OpenFlow device.
2. The bidirectional communication channel with the controller. In the downstream di-
rection (controller to devices), it is used to send messages to program the flow table
of the devices. In the upstream direction (devices to controller), it is used by the for-
warding devices to request configurations from the controller and reporting statistics
or network state changes.
3. The OpenFlow protocol that standardizes the communication between control and
data planes.
An OpenFlow device can operate in reactive or proactive mode [Benton et al., 2013]. The
reactive mode consists in requesting configuration information to the controller whenever
a packet does not match any entry on the flow table. Network applications such as in-
trusion detection systems (IDS) and network monitoring usually operate in reactive mode
[Shirali-Shahreza and Ganjali, 2013]. The reactive mode operation is described as follows
[Yan et al., 2015] [Kandoi and Antikainen, 2015]:
1. Whenever a packet is received, the switch looks up for any matching flow rule. A flow
rule can be defined as a combination of matching fields.
2. If a match is found, then the action specified in the matching flow rule entry is per-
formed. Also, the statistics (counters) of the entry are updated. In case several rules
might match the packet, a priority value assigned to the rule is used to determine
which rule to apply. If several rules have the same priority, the first match is applied.
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Figure 2-4: Out-of-band (left) and in-band (right) communication design
[Kandoi and Antikainen, 2015].
3. If the packet does not match any of the rules in the flow table, then the OpenFlow
device generates a Packet-In message. A Packet-In message is an OpenFlow message
containing the header or the entire packet. Next, the encapsulated packet is sent to
the controller so that it decides what to do with the packet.
4. The controller processes the Packet-In message. When the processing is finished, the
controller may discard the packet or may generate a FlowMod message which is sent
back to the OpenFlow device. The FlowMod message contains the packet and the
configuration information to program the flow table in the OpenFlow device. Thus,
the OpenFlow device will not need to generate further Packet-In messages for pacekts
of the same flow, which will match this newly configured flow entry. An exception to
this condition would be the case where the flow rule action is actually generating a
Packet-In message.
In contrast, the proactive mode consists in programming in advance a set of rules in the
OpenFlow devices according to the patterns of traffic that are expected or considered as
usual in the network operation.
Finally, the design of the communication channel between the controller and OpenFlow
devices can be in-band or out-of-band [Kandoi and Antikainen, 2015]. In in-band design,
the communication is performed across the same network infrastructure. It implies that
communication between controller and OpenFlow devices must be ensured somehow. In out-
of-band communication, there is a dedicated infrastructure for the communication between
the controller and the OpenFlow devices. This dedicated infrastructure might consist of
separated switching and routing hardware additional to the user network infrastructure.
Figure 2-4 shows the out-of-band and in-band communication designs.
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2.2 Distributed Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack
Despite many efforts, the magnitude and frequency of DDoS attacks has grown drastically
in the last years [Zhang et al., 2016] [Wueest, 2014]. Therefore, they have become a critical
threat to the security of different networks.
A Denial of service (DoS) attack tries to disrupt the availability of network resources to legit-
imate users. If the attack is originated from multiples sources, it is called Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attack. DDoS attacks can be launched by two methods [Yan et al., 2015]:
1. By sending malformed or corrupt packets trying to induce crashes, race conditions or
unexpected behaviors in software modules implementing protocols or network services.
Considering that these modules usually run within the operating system kernel or with
privileged permission, the attacks migh have catastrophical consequences.
2. By disrupting the connectivity. In these attacks, high volumes of valid packets are sent
aiming at exhausting resources of switches, routers and servers such as bandwidth,
sockets, CPU and memory.
DDoS attack execution usually follows a DDoS attack strategy with the following typical
steps [Zargar et al., 2013]: selection, compromise, communication and attack execution. In
the selection step, the attacker identifies hosts that can be incorporated to the attack infras-
tructure as agents. An agent is a host that has a given vulnerability that can be exploited
by the attacker in order to gain access to it. Usually, the user of the host that becomes an
agent is not aware of this fact. In the compromise step, the attacker actually exploits the
identified vulnerabilities and installs malicious code in the agents. This malicious code is
usually composed by backdoors that enable the remote control of the host and the actual
programs that perform the DDoS attack. In the communication step, the attacker configures
different parameters of the attack code. This configuration is performed via handlers. These
are hosts that communicate with the agents using well-known protocols such as TCP, UDP,
ICMP or even application protocols such as IRC or HTTP in order to coordinate the agents
to launch the attack. Finally, in the execution step, the attack is actually performed. The
attacker uses the handlers to trigger the attack execution from the agents.
2.2.1 Classification of DDoS attacks
DDoS attacks have been classified using different criteria. Some exhaustive and complete tax-
onomies can be found in the literature [Yan et al., 2015] [Zargar et al., 2013] [Peng et al., 2007]
[Mirkovic and Reiher, 2004] [Douligeris and Mitrokotsa, 2004]. We review the taxonomies
and conclude that the most common classification criteria are victim type and protocol level
.
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2.2.1.1 Classification by victim type
According to the victim type criteria, DDoS attacks can be classified into three categories:
application, host, and network [Yan et al., 2015] [Peng et al., 2007].
1. Application: They aim at exploiting vulnerabilities in software and/or specific ver-
sions of operating systems and even hardware platforms.
2. Host: In this case, the target is a particular host. Therefore, all the services running
on the host become affected. These attacks usually target network connectivity or in
some cases power resources.
3. Network: These attacks aim at isolating large segments or even the entire network by
targetting elements providing interconnection such as router interfaces or trunk links
of switches. They typically require high volumes of traffic.
2.2.1.2 Classification by protocol level
According to the protocol level criteria, DDoS attacks can be classified into two categories:
Network/Transport-level and Application-level [Mirkovic and Reiher, 2004].
Network/transport-level
These DDoS attacks are launched using network/transport protocols such as TCP, UDP and
ICMP. Network/transport-level attacks can be classified into four sub-categories [Zargar et al., 2013]:
1. Flooding attacks: The attackers try to disrupt the connectivity of the legitimate
users of the network. The disruption is made by exhausting the bandwidth of the links
connected to the victim target sending a high volume of traffic based on TCP, UDP
or ICMP protocols. Examples of these attacks are spoofed and non-spoofed UDP flood,
ICMP flood, and TCP SYN flood (Neptune) [Peng et al., 2007] [Douligeris and Mitrokotsa, 2004].
2. Protocol exploitation attacks: The attackers exploit features and operations of
the standard implementation of transport and network protocols which might lead to
unexpected situations and/or excessive consumption and exhaustion of CPU or mem-
ory resources. Examples of these attacks are TCP SYN-ACK flood, TCP PUSH-ACK
flood, and TCP RST/FIN flood [Peng et al., 2007] [Douligeris and Mitrokotsa, 2004].
3. Reflection/Amplification-based attacks: These attacks leverage on request/response
protocols which are characterized by small requests and large response messages.
In these attacks, agents send a request to a server with a spoofed source address.
This spoofed address corresponds to the attack target. By performing this action,
the responses from the servers (typically larger than the requests) are directed to-
wards the victim (indicated by the spoofed source address). The servers involved in
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these attacks are known as reflectors. Examples of these attacks are Smurf, Fraggle,
NTP-based attacks, TCP-based attacks and DNS-based attacks [Kührer et al., 2014b]
[Peng et al., 2007].
4. Malformed packet attacks: The attackers send packets with malformed headers to
the victim target trying to confuse some protocol implementations. These packets in-
duce excessive resource consumption in the victim system due to the attempts to parse
the malformations in the packets. Some examples of this category are IP fragmentation
attack and TCP Kamikaze segments [Douligeris and Mitrokotsa, 2004].
Application-level
Attackers flood with application level protocols the victim server with a few packets that con-
sume a lot of processing resources (CPU, memory and database capabilities) on the victim
services. Connectionless protocols such as DNS, SNMP, VoIP and connection-oriented proto-
cols such as FTP, HTTP, SSH and Telnet are used to launch these attacks [Kührer et al., 2014b]
[Kührer et al., 2014a]. Examples of these attacks are session flooding attacks, request flood-
ing attacks, asymmetric attacks and repeated one-shot attacks [Ranjan et al., 2009] [Ranjan et al., 2006].
Anomaly detection techniques have been used to detect and mitigate network/transport-level
and application-level DDoS attacks in computer networks. Anomaly detection techniques
create a model of the normal traffic behavior and then this model is compared with the cur-
rent network state to detect DDoS attacks [Yan et al., 2015]. Anomaly detection techniques
can be used in the context of SDN to protect the control plane.
2.2.2 Anomaly detection and DDoS attacks
Anomaly detection addresses the problem of identifying patterns in data that do not conform
to some expected behavior. These non-conforming patterns are commonly called anomalies
or outliers [Bhuyan et al., 2014]. There are many application domains for anomaly detec-
tion. Some examples are fraud detection, health care, intrusion detection for cyber-security,
and fault detection in critical systems. In order to assure the correct operation of sys-
tems, detection of anomalies or outliers is important because anomalies or outliers might
be symptom of malfuctions or situations that need to be addressed as soon as possible
[Chandola et al., 2009]. For example, an anomalous traffic pattern in a computer network
could be a symptom of intrusions or attacks.
Network intrusion detection (NID) refers to the application of anomaly detection (AD) in
computer networks to find intrusions or attacks [Chandola et al., 2009]. NID refers to de-
tection of malicious activity in computer networks. AD techniques are applicable in NID
because the behavior of the network under attack presents noticeable differences with the
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behavior in normal conditions [Bhuyan et al., 2014].
NID is based on features extracted from network traffic measurements or system call traces.
In order to apply anomaly based network intrusion detection, two things are assumed
[Gogoi et al., 2011]:
1. Most of the traffic corresponds to the normal operation of the network and only a small
portion of the traffic represents malicious activities.
2. The patterns of the malicious traffic are very different to those that can be observed
in normal traffic.
However, in general these assumptions might not be true in real world scenarios. For example,
when a network is under an intense DDoS attack, the anomalous traffic is actually more
frequent than the normal traffic [Zargar et al., 2013].
2.2.2.1 Types of anomaly detection techniques
NID techniques are classified into three main categories: statistical, machine learning, and
data mining techniques.
1. Statistical: Statistical techniques fit a statistical model for normal behavior to the
given network data and then apply a statistical inference or decision boundary to
determine if an unseen instance belongs to the normal traffic. Instances that have a
low probability to be generated from the statistical model are considered anomalies.
This approach designates an anomaly score to unseen instances and then the score is
compared using a statistical test or a predefined threshold to determine whether the
unseen instance is anomalous or not [Ahmed et al., 2016] [Patcha and Park, 2007].
2. Machine learning: Machine learning techniques improve the ability to distinguish
normal behavior from anomalies using a learning process. These techniques construct a
function that maps instances to defined classes. To achieve this goal, machine learning
mapping functions use labeled training data sets, where each instance in the train-
ing data set is labeled with one known class. Machine learning techniques consist
of two phases: training and testing. In the training phase, the normal traffic pat-
terns are defined. In the testing phase, the learnt model is applied to new network
instances, and every instance in the testing set is classified as normal or anomalous.
Machine learning techniques can be divided into classification and clustering techniques
[Buczak and Guven, 2015].
The anomaly detection techniques described above can be applied to the context of network
intrusion detection. An important feature of anomaly detection techniques is the degree
of human intervention in the training and operation on the systems developed using these
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techniques. In the context of network intrusion detection, the systems developed using
anomaly detection are usually classified in supervised, semi-supervised and unsupervised
[Chandola et al., 2009].
1. Supervised: They require a traning process consisting in feeding to the system data
sets that indicate if instances in the data sets are normal or intrusions. In the training
process, the parameters that control the detection are adjusted by a human operator.
NID techniques use training data sets that contain labeled observations for normal
and intrusion or attacks classes. Network observations are compared with the normal
model to determine if observations belong to normal or intrusion/attack classes.
2. Semi-Supervised: They require a partial training process where a data set indicating
the normal behavior is fed to the system. They tend to be more applicable but they
might be also less accurate. These techniques are more applicable than supervised
operation because they do not require labelled intrusions and attacks classes.
3. Unsupervised: These systems do not require a previous training. They adjust their
control parameters by themselves according to observation of the data and inferences
or predictions that are built. These predictions and inferences rely on the assumption
that normal behavior is more frequent than normal behavior. If this assumption is not
true, network intrusion detection techniques might suffer of high false positive rate.
2.3 Threat vectors and vulnerabilities in SDN
The security of SDN by itself has not been widely addressed [Scott-Hayward et al., 2016].
SDN separates the network into three layers: application layer, control layer, and infrastruc-
ture layer. Since SDN separates the network into layers, each layer can be vulnerable to
DDoS attacks [Kandoi and Antikainen, 2015] [Kreutz et al., 2013].
According to the targets in the SDN architecture, DDoS attacks against SDN are divided
into three categories: DDoS attacks against application layer, DDoS attacks against control
layer and DDoS attacks against infrastructure layer [Yan et al., 2015].
1. DDoS attacks against application layer: The DDoS attacks against application
layers are directed to network applications and northbound interfaces. DDoS attacks
against network applications and northbound interfaces can affect the normal behavior
of the network. For example, a malicious network application can force a behavior on
the flow rules in the flow table on forwarding devices to deny all the network traffic.
2. DDoS attacks against control layer: Despite the fact that the centralization of
the controller is logical rather than physical, it could be seen as a single point of fail-
ure. DDoS attacks against control layer can be directed to the controller, northbound
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Table 2-1: Summarization of previous work in threat vectors and vulnerabilities in SDN.
Authors Year Short description
Kandoi and Antikainen 2015 Possible DoS attacks against SDN and their
impact
Duner and Kellerer 2015 TLS could be exploited by attackers to
execute DDoS attacks against SDN due to
the costs of encryption and decryption
Hommes et al. 2014 Implications of DDoS attacks against SDN
environment and their impact
Benton et al. 2013 Overview of the vulnerabilities that can be
exploited to trigger DoS attacks
Kloti et al. 2013 Security analysis of the OpenFlow protocol
Kreutz et al. 2013 Several threat vectors and vulnerabilities in
the SDN/OpenFlow networks
Shin and Gu 2013 Scanner which launches fingerprinting
attacks against SDN networks
Fonseca et al. 2012 DDoS attack against SDN based on the
generation of packets with random IP
sources
interfaces, and southbound interfaces. A successful DDoS attack against control layer,
specially against the controller could disrupt the connectivity of the entire network.
3. DDoS attacks against infrastructure layer: DDoS attacks against infrastructure
layer are directed towards switches and southbound interfaces. The main idea of these
attacks is overwhelming the flow table capabilities of forwarding devices, and/or ex-
hausting the available bandwidth of the control channel. The final effect of this action
is hindering or totally disrupting the operation of the forwarding devices.
Some recent works explore the threat vectors and vulnerabilities of SDN. The literature
shows that SDN control plane is vulnerable to DDoS attacks. Table 2-1 summarizes the
previous work in threat vectors and vulnerabilities in SDN.
Kandoi and Antikainen [Kandoi and Antikainen, 2015] discuss two possible DoS attacks
against SDN networks and analyze the impact of these attacks. They show the relation-
ship between timeouts and bandwidth necessary for an attacker to execute a successful DoS
attack. They also discuss the necessity of prevention and mitigation strategies to overcome
these attacks.
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Duner and Kellerer [Durner and Kellerer, 2015] explore the current adoption of TLS in the
SDN/OpenFlow architecture and present measurements that show the cost of TLS encryp-
tion. They study the delay aspects and impact of TLS encryption in controllers and switches.
The results show that encryption has a severe impact on control plane performance due to
the high resource consumption that it might generate. Therefore, it might be exploited in
order to induce DoS attacks.
Hommes et al. [Hommes et al., 2014] show the implications of DDoS attacks against SDN
environments and analyze their impact. They conclude that DoS attacks might affect the
performance of controller and data plane devices. They propose a DDoS detection method
using information theory measurements to analyze the variations in the logical topology.
Benton et al. [Benton et al., 2013] provide an overview of the vulnerabilities that can be
exploited to trigger DoS attacks. They show how the vulnerabilities that present DoS risks
to SDN. They present that the reactive mode operation could be exploited by attackers to
launch a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks against SDN platforms.
Kloti et al. [Kloti et al., 2013] present a security analysis of the OpenFlow protocol. They
discover vulnerabilities where the attacker sends new flows to generate Packet-In messages
directed to the controller. This could lead to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and Infor-
mation Disclousure. In addition, they elaborate recommendations to prevent and mitigate
these vulnerabilities.
Kreutz et al. [Kreutz et al., 2013] present several threats identified in the SDN/OpenFlow
networks. They identify seven main threat vectors that affect SDN and propose mechanisms
to overcome possible attacks and build a secure and dependable SDN control platform. They
show that DoS attacks against the SDN control plane have critical consequences in the SDN
infraestructure.
Shin and Gu [Shin and Gu, 2013] introduce a fingerprinting attack against SDN networks.
They develop a scanner that generates new flows and measures the delays in order to detect
whether a network uses SDN architecture. In addition, they show how this scanner could be
used to execute DDoS attacks against SDN architecture.
Fonseca et al. [Fonseca et al., 2012] show a DDoS attack against SDN. This attack is based
on the generation of packets with random IP sources from distributed compromised hosts.
The high volume of traffic processed by the controller leads to a non-responsive state where
the forwarding devices can not communicate with the control plane, which cause the Open-
Flow switch not to forward traffic.
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techniques
In this chapter we describe the research problem and relevant techniques considered in the
development of the tesis. We present the state-of-the-art, research problem and the develop-
ment of specific objectives. We divide the chapter into five sections: Related-work, research
problem, threat vectors and vulnerabilities in SDN control plane, analysis of well-known
attacks, and analysis of anomaly detection techniques.
3.1 Related-work
We make a review of the state-of-the-art looking for DDoS detection methods and other
proposals to address the problem of DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane. The
literature reports some recent works in detection and mitigation of DDoS attacks against
the SDN control plane. We separate the related-work into two categories: DDoS control
plane attack detection and other approaches.
3.1.1 DDoS control plane attack detection
Some recent works show DDoS detection methods to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks
against the SDN control plane:
Dong et al. [Dong et al., 2016] present a detection method for DDoS attacks against SDN
controller. They inject vast number of flows with few packets (low-traffic flows). The detec-
tion method is designed to locate the compromised interfaces where malicious attackers are
connected. In addition, they show lists of DDoS attacks presented in traditional network
that could generate DDoS attacks against SDN controller.
Mousavi et al. [Mousavi and St-Hilaire, 2015] propose an early detection method of DDoS
attacks against SDN controllers. The method compares the variations of the entropy of the
destination IP addresses of the flows. This measurement determines if the rate of new flows
are directed to the same destination.
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Ashraf et al. [Ashraf and Latif, 2014] study and suggest the use of machine learning tech-
niques to mitigate intrusion and attacks in SDN with OpenFlow protocol. The proposal
presents a comparison of the machine learning techniques which can be applicable to achieve
high detection rate with their pros and cons. They conclude that machine learning techniques
can be used in the context of intrusion detection.
3.1.2 Other approaches
Some recent work show other approaches used to address the detection and mitigation of
DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane.
Mohammadi et al. [Mohammadi et al., 2017] propose a countermeasure to mitigate TCP
SYN flooding attacks in SDN. Their proposal takes advantage of dynamic programmability
nature of SDN to detect and prevent control plane saturation attacks. However, DDoS at-
tacks against the SDN control plane are possible using protocols different to TCP.
Wang et al. [Wang et al., 2015] propose a protocol-independent defense framework for SDN
networks to migitage data-to-control plane saturation attacks. Their proposal uses proac-
tive flow rule analyzer that derives proactive flow rules by reasoning the runtime logic of the
SDN controller and its applications, and a packet migration module that caches the flooding
packets and submits them to the controller using rate limit.
Shin et al. [Shin et al., 2013] propose an extension to OpenFlow data plane which reduces
the amount of data-to-control plane interactions that arise during control plane saturation
attacks. The authors addresses control plane saturation attacks based on TCP protocols.
However, SDN control plane is still vulnerable to DDoS attacks based on protocols different
to TCP.
3.1.3 Discussion
The literature shows some research works in the discovery of threat vectors and vulnerabil-
ities in SDN environments. DDoS attacks against SDN networks, specially directed to the
control plane have severe impact in the performance of the controller and forwarding devices.
These attacks are easy to execute and do not need specialized high performance devices.
We find that some DDoS detection methods have been proposed to overcome these issues.
Ashraf et al. [Ashraf and Latif, 2014] suggest machine learning techniques to detect and
mitigate attacks against SDN infrastructure such as DDoS attacks. However, training and
testing process is difficult due to the lack of datasets with labeled attacks against SDN.
Mousavi et al. [Mousavi and St-Hilaire, 2015] propose a method for early detection based on
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the entropy of the destination IP address. They assume that there exists a difference between
the distributions of destination IP under DDoS attacks and normal conditions. However,
an attacker can generate a high number of new flows with their destination IP evenly dis-
tributed and still overloads the SDN control plane. Finally, Dong et al. [Dong et al., 2016]
propose a DDoS detection method based on SPRT to detect a compromised interface during
DDoS attacks against the controllers. It assumes that only flows with few packets (low-
traffic flows) can overload the SDN control plane. However, their proposed method cannot
identify attacks where those attacks are executed using low rate traffic, bypassing the de-
tection and overloading the SDN control plane. In other approaches, the authors propose
extensions and frameworks to OpenFlow control and data planes to detect and mitigate
DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane. However, the proposals address DDoS attacks
based on TCP protocols. Table 3-1 shows an overview of the related-work and their analysis.
However, the related-work addresses the problem with the following limitations:
1. The DDoS detection methods could be bypassed by the attackers using multiples
sources using low rate traffic.
2. The proposed mitigation methods detect DDoS attacks based on TCP protocols. An
attacker can use protocols different to TCP to execute DDoS attacks against the SDN
control plane.
Now, we need to achieve a detection of DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane ex-
tracting OpenFlow traffic features in order to detect attacks and if possible, identify the
interfaces where the attacks come from. We need to identify specific vulnerabilities in con-
trol plane design, analyze the impact of these attacks, determine network intrusion detection
techniques applicable in the SDN context to detect the attacks and specify an algorithm for
the detection process.
Our DDoS detection algorithm detects DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane based
on abrupt changes in the number of Packet-In messages in a defined period of time. This as-
sumption eliminates the limitation of flow-traffic flows made by Dong et al. [Dong et al., 2016]
because our detection algorithm processes Packet-In mesages comming from all OpenFlow
switches to the controller. In addition, our detection algorithm tries to locate the source
of the DDoS attack identifying the interfaces on OpenFlow switches that generate abrupt
changes in the number of Packet-In messages generated (local perspective detection). If the
algorithm does not detect the interfaces of OpenFlow switches due to the low generation rate
of Packet-In messages, our algorithm processes the aggregated OpenFlow traffic to detect
attacks with low generation traffic rate.
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Table 3-1: Overview of related-work in DDoS attack detection against the SDN control
plane.
Authors Year Short description Analysis
Mohammadi et
al.
2017 A countermeasure to
mitigate TCP SYN
flooding attacks in SDN
The solution focusses on
detecting TCP SYN
flooding attacks. Other
attacks are not addressed
Dong et al. 2016 A detection method based
on SPRT for DDoS attacks
against SDN controllers
The method does not
detect attacks based on low
rate traffic
Mousavi et al. 2015 An early detection method




could be bypassed using
multiple sources with
similar traffic rate









Ashraf et al. 2014 An study of machine
learning techniques to
mitigate intrusions and
attacks in SDN with
OpenFlow protocol
The training of machine
learning techniques could
be complex in comparison
to other techniques





The solution does not
address DDoS attacks using
protocols different to TCP
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3.1.4 Contribution and Scope
Our contribution is a DDoS detection method which:
1. Addresses DDoS attacks using low rate traffic by monitoring the whole aggregated
OpenFlow traffic in the control communication channel.
2. Detects the attacks independent to the protocol used by attackers.
3. Tries to identify where the DDoS attacks come from.
The following items delimit the scope of our proposal:
1. We consider OpenFlow as the SDN implementation architecture. Different implemen-
tations and realizations of SDN architecture will not be considered.
2. We will address the detection of Network/transport-level DDoS flooding attacks. We
do not address application-level or other kinds of DDoS attacks against the SDN control
plane.
3. We consider the attacks which target the controllers. Attacks against northbound and
southbound interfaces are out of the scope.
4. We consider the attacks which affect controller capabilities. Flow tables capabilities
are out of the scope of the tesis.
3.2 Research problem
In this section we present the problem statement, threat model, and attack traffic analysis.
3.2.1 Problem statement
Successful DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane, specially against the controller,
could render unavailable a large segment or even the entire network [Yan et al., 2015] [Benton et al., 2013].
These attacks have some specific features that make difficult their detection using traditional
DDoS defense mechanisms [Dong et al., 2016]:
1. It is difficult for OpenFlow devices to detect DDoS traffic, specially if the attacker
compromises multiple user subnets using low traffic rate attacks.
2. It is difficult to differentiate DDoS traffic and bursty non-malicious traffic.
3. These attacks have a similar behavior of reflection-based flooding attacks, so that the
DDoS traffic is not directed to the control plane.
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Figure 3-1: Threat model [Dong et al., 2016].
4. DoS and DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane might be executed using easily
accessible tools. In addition, these attacks do not require specialized or high perfor-
mance hardware.
Anomaly detection techniques could be applied in the context of network intrusion to protect
the SDN infraestructure against DoS and DDoS attacks [Ashraf and Latif, 2014]. However,
the properties of DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane make difficult or even impos-
sible the development of universal detection mechanism to detect all possible variations of
these attacks. Furthermore, the selection of anomaly techniques in the context of network
intrusion depends on the scenerio where they will be used. Thus, choosing network intrusion
detection techniques is not a straightforward task [Yan et al., 2015] [Bhuyan et al., 2014]
[Zargar et al., 2013].
3.2.2 Threat model
Figure 3-1 shows the threat model. We employ the same threat model used by Dong. et al.
[Dong et al., 2016]. In the basic threat model, the SDN network has a controller, OpenFlow
switches and user subnets. OpenFlow switches are connected to the controller. OpenFlow
devices are connected between them. We assume that the attacker takes control of one or
more hosts inside user subnets. We also assume that the SDN network is working in reactive
mode.
During the DDoS attack, we further assume that DDoS attacks can be originated from any
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user subnet connected to any OpenFlow switch. In addition, the attacker can generate new
flows using the compromised hosts in the user subnets. Considering that the network is
operating in reactive mode, when a large number of new flows are created by the attacking
hosts, the OpenFlow switches will generate high volume of Packet-In messages towards the
controller. Thus, the purpose of the attack is to overload the SDN controller to render it
unavailable. This will cause that the OpenFlow switches can not forward traffic coming from
the non-compromised hosts in the network.
Dong et al. [Dong et al., 2016] made the assumption that only flows with few packets (low-
traffic flows) can be used to launch DDoS attack against SDN control plane. The premise
says that the attacker can not execute a effective DDoS attack against SDN control plane if
he does not use low-traffic flows. However, it is not difficult to attackers to generate high-
traffic flows and damage the SDN control plane. In addition, Dong et al. [Dong et al., 2016]
develop their DDoS detection method to find the compromised interface of OpenFlow devices
where the attacks comes from. However, it is possible that the attacker executes a DDoS
attack using multiple compromised hosts generating a low rate of new flows to overload the
controller. We extend the method proposed by Dong et al. [Dong et al., 2016] with the
analysis of the aggregated OpenFlow traffic in the communication channel trying to detect
DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane when DDoS attacks are generated using low
traffic rate.
3.2.3 Attack traffic analysis
The attacker has to discover the conditions that generate new configuration requirements in
the flow table in OpenFlow devices (Packet-In events). Then, the attacker sends packets with
random headers using the agents to generate new flows matching the new flow generation
condition. Next, the OpenFlow switch encapsulates every packet and sends a Packet-In
message to the controller. We observe that the features of a DDoS attack against SDN
control plane (the controller) are the following:
• The attacker uses the compromised hosts in user subnets to generate new flows.
• Due to the reactive mode operation, OpenFlow devices encapsulate the packet in a
Packet-In message and sent it to the controller.
• The controller receives a high volume of Packet-In messages in a short period of time.
We find that the main feature of the attack is the generation of Packet-In messages in a
short period of time. Then, we suspect to find DDoS attacks when the network presents
abrupt changes in the number of Packet-In message in short periods of time. Figure 3-2
shows an example of the DDoS attack behavior. The red box in the figure represents the
moment when network traffic could be a symptom of a suspicious behavior such as a DDoS
executed by an attacker.
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Figure 3-2: Suspicious behavior of the network traffic.
3.3 Threat vectors and vulnerabilities in the SDN control
plane
The following corresponds to the development of the specific objective 1. SDN has two
properties which makes attractive to attackers. In this section, we analyze the threat vec-
tors and vulnerabilities of the SDN infraestructure. We analyze the vulnerabilities in the
control plane that could lead to a successful DDoS attack against SDN control plane.
The Figure 3-3 shows the threat vectors and vulnerabilities of SDN. Kreutz et al. [Kreutz et al., 2013]
present seven threat vectors and vulnerabilities of SDN environments: faked traffic flows
(threat vector 1), exploitation of vulnerabilities on switches (threat vector 2), attacks against
control-data plane communications (threat vector 3), exploitation of vulnerabilities on con-
trollers (threat vector 4), lack of mechanisms to ensure trust between the controller and
management applications (threat vector 5), attacks to administrative stations and vulnera-
bilities presented on them (threat vector 6), and lack of trusted resources for forensics and
remediation (threat vector 7).
We find that faked traffic flows (threat vector 1), exploitation of vulnerabilities on switches
(threat vector 2), exploitation of vulnerabilities on controllers (threat vector 4) and attacks
to administrative stations and vulnerabilities present on them (threat vector 6) might be
doors for DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane. These threat vectors are described
as follows:
1. Faked traffic flows (threat vector 1): Faked traffic flows are flows where packets
are created, modified or altered by spoofing one or more headers. The generation of
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Figure 3-3: SDN theat vector map [Kreutz et al., 2013].
these flows can be used to attack control and data planes targeting the flow tables
of OpenFlow switches and controller resources. The attacker could trigger this threat
using compromised devices such as switches, servers or personal computers. Authenti-
cation mechanisms and TLS communications could help to mitigate the problem where
only legitimate users could generate flows. However, if an attacker compromises legiti-
mate users hosts, the threat continues. In addition, authentication mechanisms or TLS
communications can generate an additional cost in the SDN infraestructure worsening
the impact of the attacks [Durner and Kellerer, 2015].
2. Exploitation of vulnerabilities on switches (threat vector 2): An attacker that
takes control of OpenFlow switches in SDN infraestructure can use them to drop, clone,
inject or slow down packets in the network. If an attacker exploits vulnerabilities in
the switches and takes control of them, it is possible to make DDoS attacks against the
SDN control plane injecting high volume of Packet-In messages towards the controller.
3. Exploitation of vulnerabilities on controllers (threat vector 4): A faulty or
malicious controller could compromise the entire network. If an attacker compromises
the controller, he can potentially do anything it pleases in the network.
4. Attacks to administrative stations and vulnerabilities present on them (threat
vector 6): The administrative stations are an exploitable target in the network. If
an attacker takes control of administrative stations and these stations control elements
such as switches and controllers, he can make malicious actions on the entire network
such as DoS and DDoS attacks shutting down the control and data plane elements.
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Threat vectors 4 and 6 can be used to shutdown the control plane of the network. How-
ever, an attacker can not easily take control of the controller and administrative stations
in the SDN infraestructure because these devices are usually isolated or have been heavily
hardened due to the importance of these elements in the network. Threat vectors 1 and 2
can be exploited to generate high volume of Packet-In messages directed to the controller.
However, if the attacker want to use the threat vector 2 to compromise the controller, he
needs to exploit vulnerabilities on switches to take the control of them. Then, the attacker
can generate high volume of Packet-In messages and overload the control plane. An attacker
can prefer to use the threat vector 1 because taking control of hosts in the network might be
easier than compromising forwarding devices. Threat vector 1 permits an attacker to execute
easily DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane. In addition, the attacker can generate
easily faked packets using the compromised hosts in the network using easily accessible tools.
SDN becomes attractive to attackers due to logical centralization of the control operations
in the controller [Kloti et al., 2013]. The controller can be seen as a single point of failure in
the network. Despite this notion of single point of failure could be mitigated with physically
distributed control plane, each instance might be target of an attack and depending on how
the distribution is implemented, the DDoS attacks migh still affect the network depending
on the operation mode of OpenFlow switches.
An OpenFlow switch can operate in proactive or reactive mode [Benton et al., 2013]. In this
mode, the controller has to process the Packet-In messages and then send back to the switch
the configuration of flow rules in response to these Packet-In messages. OpenFlow switches
which operate in reactive mode might be vulnerable to DDoS attacks [Kandoi and Antikainen, 2015].
If an attacker floods the control plane with faked traffic flows at a high rate and the flooded
flows requests arrive at the controller, and they will consume resources such as CPU, mem-
ory and bandwidth [Zhang et al., 2016]. If the control plane does not have any protection,
the resources of the controller might be exhausted and the controller might crash. When
the controller crashes, forwarding devices can not manage new flows and the connectivity
becomes unavailable to legitimate users.
Most of DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane have severe impact in networks using
reactive mode operation. An attacker can easily overload the control plane if the network
operates in reactive mode. Networks using proactive mode operations do not have the same
exposure to DDoS attacks unless explicit flow rules force to encapsulate and send Packet-In
messages to the controller [Benton et al., 2013].
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3.4 Analysis of well-known attacks
The following corresponds to the development of the specific objective 2. We analyze the at-
tacks presented in 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data sets [Laboratory, 1999].
We use these data sets because they are widely used in intrusion detection evaluation and
contain about 56 types of attacks and 201 attack instances. Throughout our analysis, the
packets with the same four-tuple (source IP, source port, destination IP, and destination
port), were considered to belong to the same flow. In addition, each packet using network
protocol such as ICMP packets (that do not have source IP and destination IP) is considered
as an individual flow.
In this section, we analyze how the attacks that are present on the data sets might impact
the SDN control plane when they are executed in the context of SDN.
DoS attacks in legacy networks
We analyze the DDoS attacks in the data set and find that the following well-known DDoS
attacks can be used for an attacker to execute DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane.
The DDoS attacks are: Neptune and Smurf [Dong et al., 2016] [Laboratory, 1999].
1. Neptune: This is a SYN flood attack directed to one or more ports in the victim
hosts. A SYN flood attack is a form of DoS attack in which an attacker sends high
number of SYN requests to a victim host. The attacker attempts to consume server
resources to make the system unresponsive to legitimate traffic. Neptune attacks can
generate high volume of flows in a short perior of time. Neptune attacks can generate
high volume of flows in a short period of time, overloading controller.
2. Smurf: This is a DDoS attack in which large numbers of ICMP requests with the
spoofed source IP of the victim and a broadcast address as a destination IP are sent to
a network. Most devices on the network send responses to the source IP address sent
in the ICMP request. High number of ICMP responses flood the victim hosts. This
attack generates high number of flows in a short period of time.
Probe attacks in legacy networks
We analize the Probe attacks in the data set and find that the following well-known probes
attacks presented in legacy networks can be used for an attacker to execute DDoS at-
tacks against the SDN control plane. The probes attacks are: Portsweep and Ipsweep
[Dong et al., 2016] [Laboratory, 1999].
1. Portsweep: The attacker scans many ports of a computer system to determine which
services are supported by the system. An attacker can use multiples sources to scan
many ports of one or more hosts of a network, generating a high number of new flows.
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2. Ipsweep: The attacker sends an ICMP request to all hosts of a network to determine
which hosts are alive in the network. If the attacker targets a network with many hosts
and launches a ipsweep, he can generate high number of flows.
DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane
An attacker could use the generation of faked packets in short periods of time to execute a
resource consumption attack of the control plane. If an attacker knows how to generate flows
that do not match the flow rules in the flow table of OpenFlow switches, the attacker can use
this condition and send many packets with random headers to create new flow rules. These
packets will be reported to the control plane as Packet-In messages. The processing of high
volume of Packet-In messages consumes a lot of resources and can overload the controller.
The attacker can infer the condition that he will use to generate new flow traffic using a
SDN fingerprinting attack against SDN environments [Shin and Gu, 2013].
If the attacker knows the condition, he can use it to generate high volume of new flows
that are directed to the controller as a Packet-In messages and make the unavailable the
connectivity of the user subnets.
In conclusion, SDN attacks against the SDN control plane have severe impact in the SDN
infraestructure. The controller can crash due to the high resource consumption produced by
high volume of Packet-In messages processed, causing a disruption of the network connectiv-
ity as OpenFlow switches can no longer forward traffic. The attacker can employ well-known
attacks presented in the legacy networks such as Neptune, Smurf, Portsweep and Ipsweep
to execute DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane. These attacks can generate high
volume of new flows and can be executed using easily accesible tools.
3.5 Analysis of anomaly detection techniques
The following corresponds to the development of the specific objective 3. We need to
choose an anomaly detection technique to be used in our DDoS detection algorithm to
detect DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane. We select the anomaly detection tech-
niques aiming at premises of high accuracy, low false positive rate and minimal overhead
that literature used in the context of SDN [Dong et al., 2016] [Mousavi and St-Hilaire, 2015]
[Ashraf and Latif, 2014] [Xing et al., 2013]. We describe the following anomaly detection
techniques: Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT), entropy, Support Vector Machine
(SVM) and Rules based.
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Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT)
Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) is a statistical method to detect anomalies in com-
puter networks. SPRT is a sequential hypothesis that tests a sequential data to determine
if the observations belong to normal or anomalous classes. SPRT minimizes the number of
successive observations needed to take a decision: accept or reject the null hypothesis.




We can make two types of errors: false positives and false negatives defined as α and β,
respectively. We can see α and β as follows:
{
α = P (deciding for H1whenH0 is true)
β = P (deciding for H0whenH1 is true)
The next step is calculated the accumulative sum defined as:





where xi corresponds to the current observation.
The idea behind the sequential testing gets an observation xi one at a time and calculates
the function Si to take a decision according to the stopping rule:

A < Sn < B : collectmore observations and repeat the process
Sn ≥ B : acceptH1 and stop the hypothesis test
Sn ≤ A : acceptH0 and stop the hypothesis test












Dong et al. [Dong et al., 2016] use SPRT to detect novel DDoS attacks against the SDN
control plane. They compare SPRT and entropy and conclude that SPRT can achieve better
results according to the measures of accuracy, false positive rate and false negative rate in
comparison with entropy solutions.
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Entropy
Entropy is a statistical method to detect anomalies in a traffic data. Entropy measures the
randomness in a network. The higher the randomness, the higher is the entropy and vice
versa.
Let define W as a set of data x1, x2, ..., xn where n corresponds to the number of observations




Now, we measure the entropy, referred to as H (x), with the formula:
H (x) = −
n∑
i
(Pi ∗ log (Pi))
If all the elements have the same probabilities, the value of the entropy is the maximum.
If an element appears more than others, the entropy will be lower. Then, a classification
function is defined to normal and anomalous classes as:
f (H (x)) =
{
anomalous, H (x) < threshold
normal, Otherwise
Mousavi et al. [Mousavi and St-Hilaire, 2015] use entropy of the destination IP addresses
to detect DDoS attacks against SDN controllers. If the entropy is low, then a DDoS attack
against SDN controller was executed. However, a widely distributed DDoS attack can lead
to a maximum entropy and bypass the detection.
Support Vector Machine (SVM)
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised machine learning technique widely used in
the context of network intrusion detection. SVM built a model constructing a hyperplane
in a high-dimensional space which is used to classify network observations into normal or
anomalous classes. The hyperplane separates the normal and anomalous using the largest
distance to the nearest training data points between normal and anomalous classes. The
distance between the hyper plane that separates the anomaly and normal classes and the
closes network data points is maximized and is called the margin. Figure 3-4 shows a sim-
ple example of a SVM classifier using a linear hyperplane. Since, linear hyperplane is not
applicable to all possible training data, the hyperplane is defined by a kernel function. The
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Figure 3-4: Simple example of SVM classifier [Ashraf and Latif, 2014].
kernel function takes the nearest training data points and creates a function that separates
the classes. SVM is considering one of the fastest machines learning techniques and usually
performs better than other classification techniques.
Ashraf et al. [Ashraf and Latif, 2014] suggest the use of SVM to detect and mitigate attacks
against SDN infrastructure because in the context of intrusion detection has shown accuracy
results in legacy networks.
SVMs have the advantages that in the context of intrusion detection report attacks with
an accuracy of around 98%. However, SVMs need a training dataset with labelled normal
and anomalous classes. In addition, the improper distribution of the training network traffic
data could lead to low accuracy and high false positive rate.
Rule-based approach
Rule-based approach is one of the most widely used machine learning techniques to detect
anomalies in computer networks. Rule-based approach has associated a knowledge base
that contains the rules that describe the normal and anomalous classes, and rule engine that
matches rules against the current state of the network traffic. Depending on the results of the
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matching, one or more rules can be evaluated and finally reach into normal or anomalous
classes. A rule is described as a relationship between different attributes of a network
observation. For example, we have an observation with the attributes X and Y. We can
define a rule as follows:
IF (X isA) AND (Y isB) THEN (ANOMALOUS TRAFFIC)
Xing et al. [Xing et al., 2013] uses Snort and OpenFlow to detect and mitigate attacks in
the network. Snort is a popular open source rule-based IDS that matches each observed
packets against a set of rules. Thus, Snort rules idenfity attacks based on headers such as
Ip address, TCP or UDP port numbers, and ICMP headers.
The selected anomaly detection techniques shows high accuracy, low false positive rate,
low false positive rate and mininal overhead during the detection process. However, we
choose to use of SPRT as our DDoS detection due to comparable results with the others
anomaly detection algorithm, but the implementation of the technique is easier than the
other techniques. In addition, SPRT has beed used in the context of SDN with good results
[Dong et al., 2016].
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4 Solution description
In this chapter we describe our proposed solution. We present the research problem and
the results of each specific objective. We divide the chapter into five sections: Research
problem, threat vectors and vulnerabilities in SDN control plane, analysis of well-known
attacks, analysis of anomaly detection techniques, and detection of DDoS attacks against
SDN control plane.
4.1 Detection of DDoS attacks against SDN control plane
The following corresponds to the development of the specific objective 4. In this section,
we present the detection function based on SPRT, we introduce the notion of local perspec-
tive and global perspective detection functions, and finally we define our DDoS detection
algorithm.
4.1.1 Detection function based on SPRT
In this section, we describe the detection function used in our detection algorithm. The de-
tection function is based on the proposed detection method by Dong et al. [Dong et al., 2016]
using SPRT. Let define the variable Xt as the number of Packet-In messages in the interval
∆t.
We define a function f (Xt) as:
f (Xt) =
{




Xmax is a threshold for the variable Xt
Now, we consider the following hypothesis test:
{
H1 : network under attack
H0 : network under normal conditions
(4-2)
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In reality, the detection function can make two types of errors: false positives and false neg-
atives. False positives correspond to the acceptance of H1 when H0 is true. False negatives
correspond to the acceptance of H0 when H1 is true. To avoid these two errors, α and β are
defined as the probabilities of false positives and false negatives, respectively. The error rate
for false positive and false negative should not exceed α and β.
Next, We define a function Sn n = 1, 2, · · · , n as the evaluation the values f1, f2, ..., fn.
Then, the function Sn evaluates:
Sn = ln
(
P [f1, f2, · · · , fn | H1]
P [f1, f2, · · · , fn | H0]
)
(4-3)
Each observation of the variable Xt does not depend on the previous observations and has
the same distribution. Then, we assume that each value of the function f is independent





P [fi | H1]







P [fi | H1]





P [fi | H0] 6= {0, 1}
P [fi | H1] 6= {0, 1}
Let define:
P (f (Xt) = 1 | H1) = 1− P (f (Xt) = 0 | H1) = λ1 (4-5)
P (f (Xt) = 1 | H0) = 1− P (f (Xt) = 0 | H0) = λ0 (4-6)
where λ1 > λ0 because is more probably that high number of Packet-In messages are injected
in a network under attack than under normal conditions. We find a limitation in the values
of λ1 and λ0. The detection function works if the values of λ1 and λ0 are different to {0,1}.
However, these values of these parameters are unrealistic. If we put a value of λ1=1, this
means that in a network under attack, the number of flows in a period of time will be always
high. If we put a value of λ1=0, this means that an attacker can generate DDoS attacks
against SDN control plane without the generation of high number of Packet-In messages in
a short period of time, attacks such as Portsweep, Smurf and Neptune can generate high
number of Packet-In messages in short periods of time. Furthermore, if we put a value
of λ0=1, this means that a network during normal conditions always has high volume of
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Packet-In messages. Finally, if we put a value of λ0=0, this means that a network during
normal conditions never has high volume of Packet-In messages, but bursty nonmalicious
traffic could exists.


























Where S0 = 0.












where the value of α and β is choosen between the inverval (0, 1). The recommended values
of α and β are between 0 and 0.05 [Dong et al., 2016].
Now, we define the detection function based on the equation (4-8) to test wheter the network
is under attack and under normal conditions. The detection function is a simple thresholding
scheme given as follows:
Dn =

A < Sn < B : indicate that needmore observations tomake a decision (return − 1)
Sn ≥ B : acceptH1 and reset to the initial values of the detection function (return 1)
Sn ≤ A : acceptH0 and reset to the initial values of the detection function (return 0)
(4-9)
4.1.2 Local perspective and global perspective detection functions
We separate the functionality of our algorithm in two perspectives: local perspective detec-
tion and global perspective detection. Local perspective detection analyzes the OpenFlow
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traffic passing through specific interfaces in OpenFlow switches. Local perspective detec-
tion evaluates the detection function defined above for every interface of OpenFlow switches
connected to user subnets. This perspective tries to identify where DDoS attacks come
from. Global perspective detection tries to detect DDoS attacks when local perspective
detection could not report detection of DDoS attacks. This situation could happen when
the attacker launch a DDoS attack using low flow rate. Global perspective evaluates the
detection function, taking the number of the aggregated Packet-In messages in the entire
control communication channel.
For local detection perspective, we define the variables Xs,it as the number of Packet-In
messages in 4t passing through the interface i of the OpenFlow switch s, and Xs,imax as the
threshold for the function f. For global detection perspective, we define the variable XGt as
the number of the aggregated Packet-In messages during 4t in the control communication
channel, and the XGmax as the threshold for the function f . In local perspective detection, we
define the functions f s,in and S
s,i













perspective detection, we define the functions fGn and S
G














Now, the detection function for local perspective detection corresponds to the evaluation of




n . Global perspective detection evaluates the





4.1.3 DDoS detection algorithm
Figure 4.1 shows the DDoS detection algorithm. First, the algorithm reads the parameters




max. Then, we initialize the variables for local perspective detec-
tion and global perspective detection. The variable statuss,i and statusG indicate if local per-
spective detection or global perspective detection is analyzing the variables XGmax andX
s,i
max
and are set true when abrupt changes in the number of Packet-In messages. The variables
alarms,i and alarmG indicates when the algorithm raises an alarm detection. Then, the algo-
rithm monitors the control communication channel every ∆t waiting for a Packet-In arrives.
If a Packet-In arrives the monitor function is executed. Figure 4.2 shows the monitor func-
tion of the DDoS detection algorithm. Next, the algorithm executes the local perspective
detection and global perspective detection functions.
Figure 4.3 shows the local perspective detection function. Local perspective detection func-
tion evaluates every interface connected to user subnets in every OpenFlow switch in the
network. First, the function f s,i is executed to verify an abrupt change in the number of
Packet-In messages in the ∆t. If the function f returns 1, the value of variable status
s,i is set
true. This means that the local perspective detection is running because an abrupt change
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Algorithm 4.1 DDoS detection algorithm.
1. function DDoSDetectionAlgorithm():






4. ’Variables for Local Perspective Detection and Global Perspective Detection’
5. Xs,it , X
G
t = 0
6. statuss,i, statusG = false
7. Ss,in , S
G
n = 0
8. alarms,i, alarmG = false
9. while (Time) do:
10. while(inside ∆t) do:




15. if(LocalPerspectiveDetection does not detect an attack):
16. execute GlobalPerspectiveDetection()
17. if(∆t+1):





Algorithm 4.2 Monitor function.
1. function Monitor():
2. ’Calculate variables for local perspective detection’
3. get i = interface
4. get s = switch
5. Xs,it = X
s,i
t + 1
6. ’Calculate variables for global perspective detection’
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Algorithm 4.3 LocalPerspectiveDetection function.
1. function LocalPerspectiveDetection():
2. foreach (i = interface, s = OpenFlow switch) do:
3. if (f s,i = 1):
4. statuss,i = true
5. endif
6. if (statuss,i = true):






8. Ds,in = Dn (S
s,i
n )
9. if (Ds,in = 1):
10. alarms,i = true
11. Ss,in = 0
12. else if (Ds,in = 0):
13. alarms,i = false
14. statuss,i = false
15. Ss,in = 0
16. endif
17. if (alarms,i = true):






was found. If the value of the variable statuss,i is true, then the algorithm executes the
functions Ss,in and D
s,i
n . If the value of D
s,i
n is 1, then the value of alarm
s,i is set to true. This
means that an attacks is detected and the variable Ss,in is reseted to 0. By the other hand, if
the value of Ds,in is 0, then the network is under normal conditions and the value of alarm
s,i
is set to false and the value of Ss,in is reseted to 0. Finally, the algorithm evaluates the value
of the alarms,i. If the value of alarms,i is true, an attack was detected and the algorithm
raise an alarm showing the timestamp, the OpenFlow switch and the interface where the
attack comes from. Otherwise, if the value of alarms,i is false, this means that the network
is under normal conditions.
Now, global perspective detection is always applied if local perspective detection could not
detect an attack. Figure 4.4 shows the global perspective detection function. Global per-
spective detection function does the same steps that local perspective detection using the
global perspective funtions that evaluate the variables XGt and X
G
max. Finally, the algorithm




t for local perspective
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Algorithm 4.4 GlobalPerspectiveDetection function
1. function GlobalPerspectiveDetection():
2. if (fG = 1):
3. statusG = true
4. end
5. if(statusG = true):










8. if (DGn = 1):
9. alarmG = true
10. SGn = 0
11. else if (DGn = 0):
12. alarmG = false
13. statusG = false
14. SGn = 0
15. end
16. if (alarmG = true):




detection and global perspective detection are set to 0.
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In this chapter, we present the evaluation of our DDoS detection algorithm We conduct a
series of experiments to answer the following three questions:
1. What is the accuracy, false positive rate and false negative rate of our DDoS
detection algorithm? Using data sets, we evaluate the measures of accuracy, false
positive rate and false negative rate for our DDoS detection algorithm.
2. How sensitive is our DDoS detection algorithm to parameters settings? We
perform the sensibility analysis to parameter settings. We show how the detection time
changes in function of the parameters required.
3. What are the limitations of our DDoS detection algorithm? We analyze the
results of the accuracy, false positive rate and false negative rate to find the limitation
of our DDoS detection algorithm.
We divide the chapter three sections: Analytical evaluation, implementation, sensibility
analysis and limitations.
5.1 Analytical evaluation
In this section, we present the analytical evaluation of the DDoS detection algorithm. We
evaluate the measures of accuracy, false positive rate and false negative rate of our solution.
The local perspective detection and global perspective detection of the DDoS detection al-
gorithm use the detection function to analyze abrupt changes in the number of Packet-In
messages in a period of time. We can evaluate the measures of accuracy, false positive rate
and false negative rate evaluating the detection function on either local perspective detection
or global perspective detection due to both use the same detection function using different
parameters.
In the analytical evaluation, we use data sets to measure the accuracy, false positive rate
and false negative rate. Then, we use the detection function on global perspective detection
for the analytical evaluation because the data sets do not have interfaces and OpenFlow




We measure the accuracy, false positive rate and false negative rate for our DDoS detection




False PositiveRate (FPR) = FP
FP+TN




TP = True positives
TN = True negatives
FP = False positives
FN = False negatives
5.1.2 Data sets
We chose the same Data Set used in Dong et al. [Dong et al., 2016] evaluation. We chose
the 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data Set. This dataset is widely used in
intrusion detection and contains both training data without/with attacks and testing data
with abundant types of attacks.
The evaluation methodology is described as follows:
1. We use the data sets to calculate an initial parameters setting for the DDoS detection
algorithm.
2. We evaluate the initial parameters setting using experiments to determine the best
parameters for our DDoS detection algorithm.
3. We evaluate the accuracy, false positive rate and false negative rate for our DDoS
detection algorithm.
The data sets used for training and testing are shown as follows:
Data set March 4th: This data set corresponds to the network traffic without attacks.
This data set is used to calculate the threshold Xmax for the detection function on global
perspective detection in the DDoS detection algorithm using different values of 4t.
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Figure 5-1: Number of flows on Data Set April 5th.
Data set April 5th: This data set is used to determine what values of the parameters 4t
and Xmax result in the highest accuracy, lowest false positive rate and lowest false negative
rate. The Figure 5-1 shows the number of flows in this data set between 8:00:00 and 20:00:00.
Three attacks that might generate high number of flows in a short period of time have been
identified in dataset April 5th:
1. Portsweep: This attack is executed at 9:43:11 and has duration of 223 seconds.
2. Smurf: This attack is executed at 13:18:12 and has duration of 1 second.
3. Neptune: This attack is executed at 18:04:04 and has duration of 411 seconds.
The data set shows other points where the number of flows is high. These points are consid-
ered as bursty non-malicious flows. We evaluate the metrics of accuracy, false positive rate
and false negative rate considering and excluding the Portsweep attacks due to these attacks
could generate or not high volume of new flows.
Data set April 6th: This corresponds to a testing data set. It is used for the testing pro-
cess. The Figure 5-2 shows the number of flows between 8:00:00 and 20:00:00. Two attacks
that might generate high number of flows in a short period of time have been identified in
data set April 6th:
1. Neptune: This attack is executed at 11:38:04 and has duration of 821 seconds.
2. Neptune: This attack is executed at 18:16:05 and has duration of 206 seconds.
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Figure 5-2: Number of flows on Data Set April 6th.
5.1.3 Parameter settings
Table 5-1 shows the values of parameter settings that we use in the analytical evaluation.
The values of the parameters of the DDoS detection algorithm are chosen as follows:
1. 4t: We define the domain for 4t as the list of values 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 and 1.0 seconds.
2. Xmax: We choose the value of Xmax as the mean of the number of flows plus three
times the value of the standard deviation for each 4t. We calculate the value of Xmax
for each 4t using the dataset March 4th and count the number of flows in the 4t that
are normal according the Xmax. We find that 96% of the number of flows in 4t are
considered as normal analyzing the data set March 4th.
3. α, β, λ1, λ0: We use the same parameter settings used by Dong et al. [Dong et al., 2016].
The values of α, β, λ1, λ0 are 0.01, 0.02, 0.6 and 0.33, respectively.
5.1.4 Experiments
The experiments for the analytical evaluation are the following:
1. Run the algorithm using 41t and X1max on Data Set April 5th.
2. Run the algorithm using 42t and X2max on Data Set April 5th.
3. Run the algorithm using 43t and X3max on Data Set April 5th.
4. Run the algorithm using 44t and X4max on Data Set April 5th.
5. Run the algorithm on Data Set April 6th.
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We divide the experiments in training and testing experiments. The first four experiments
corresponds to the training experiments. The training experiments are done to compare the
results between them and select the parameters that result with the highest accuracy, lowest
false positive rate and lowest false negative rate. Finally, the last experiment corresponds
to the testing experiment. The testing experiment evaluates the algorithm using a testing
data set using the metrics of accuracy, false positive rate and false negative rate.
5.1.5 Results
We show the results of the training and testing experiments. The Figures 5-3, 5-4, 5-5,
5-6 and 5-7 shows the results of the training and testing experiments. The Table 5-8 and
Table 5-9 shows the metrics of the training experiments considering and excluding Portsweep
attacks, respectively. The Table 5-10 shows the metrics for the testing experiments.
5.1.5.1 Results using 41t and X1max on Data Set April 5th
For this experiment we run the DDoS detection algorithm using the parameters 41t and
X1max. If we consider the Portsweep attack, we achieved a 98.12% of accuracy with 0.77%
of false positives and 72.16% of false negatives. If we do not consider the Portsweep attack,
we achieve a 98.72% of accuracy, 0.77% of false positives and 95.67% of false negatives. The
algorithm does not detect all the traffic generated by the Portsweep. The traffic generated
by the Smurf attack is detected. However, the most of the attack traffic is generated by
the Neptune attack. Only some traffic generated by the Neptune attack is detected by the
algorithm. These situation leads to an extremely high false negative rate.
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Figure 5-3: Results using 41t and X1max on
Data Set April 5th.
Figure 5-4: Results using 42t and X2max on
Data Set April 5th.
Figure 5-5: Results using 43t and X3max on
Data Set April 5th.
Figure 5-6: Results using 44t and X4max on
Data Set April 5th.
Figure 5-7: Results using the best 4t and Xmax on Data Set April 6th.
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Figure 5-8: Metrics of the training experiments considering Portsweep.
Experiment Accuracy FPR FNR
Results using 41t and X1max 98.12% 0.77% 72.16%
Results using 42t and X2max 98.86% 0.52% 44.97%
Results using 43t and X3max 98.68% 0.85% 17.22%
Results using 44t and X4max 98.37% 1.17% 18.15%
Figure 5-9: Metrics of the training experiments without considering Portsweep.
Experiment Accuracy FPR FNR
Results using 41t and X1max 98.72% 0.77% 95.67%
Results using 42t and X2max 99.12% 0.52% 41.52%
Results using 43t and X3max 99.23% 0.77% 0.49%
Results using 44t and X4max 98.85% 0.001% 0.01%







5.1.5.2 Results using 42t and X2max on Data Set April 5th
For this experiment we run the DDoS detection algorithm using the parameters 42t and
X2max. If we consider the Portsweep attack, we achieved a 98.86% of accuracy with 0.52% of
false positives and 44.97% of false negatives. If we do not consider the Portsweep attack, we
achieve a 99.12% of accuracy, 0.52% of false positives and 41.52% of false negatives. This
experiment shows results similar to the parameters delta1 and delta1. Only some traffic of
the Portsweep and Neptune attack is considered an attack. The traffic generated by the
smurf attack is detected by the algorithm. The results of the experiments for 41t ,X1max and
42t ,X2max leads to excessive false negative rate. These parameters will not be used in the
testing experiment.
5.1.5.3 Results using 43t and X3max on Data Set April 5th
For this experiment, we run the DDoS detection algorithm using the parameters 43t and
X3max. If we consider the Portsweep attack, we achieved a 98.68% of accuracy with 0.85%
of false positives and 17.22% of false negatives. The value of the false positive rate is high
because the Portsweep attack is not detected by the algorithm because this attack generates
low number of flows in a short period of time. If we do not consider the Portsweep attack,
we achieve a 99.23% of accuracy, 0.77% of false positives and 0.49% of false negatives. The
traffic generated by the Smurf attack is not detected in both cases. This situation happens
due to the duration of the attack (1 second). The traffic generated by the Neptune attack
is detected and the algorithm raises detection.
5.1.5.4 Results using 44t and X4max on Data Set April 5th
For this experiment, we run the DDoS detection algorithm using the parameters 44t and
X4max. If we consider the Portsweep attack, we achieved a 98.37% of accuracy with 1.17% of
false positives and 18.15% of false negatives. We analyze the false negative rate and we find
that this value is due to the algorithm does not detect the Portsweep attack. If we do not
consider the Portsweep attack, we achieve a 98.85% of accuracy, 0.001% of false positives
and 0.01% of false negatives. In addition, the algorithm does not detect the traffic generated
by Smuft attack because the short duration of the attack (1 second). In both cases, the
traffic generated by the Neptune attack is detected.
We find that the parameters that show the highest accuracy, lowest false positive rate
and lowest false negative rate correspond to 43t and X3max. The parameters 43t ,X3max and
44t ,X4max show similar results. However, the parameters 43t and X3max reduce the time of




Figure 5-11: Mininet topology used in the implementation.
5.1.5.5 Results on Data Set April 6th
For this experiment we run the DDoS detection algorithm using the parameters 4t and
Xmax that shows the highest acuracy, lowest false positive rate and lowest false negative
rate. These parameters correspond to the values of 43t and X3max . In this experiment, we
achieved an accuracy of 99.94% with a 0.04% of false positives and 0.07% of false negatives.
In addition, we found that the algorithm has a delay to raise a detection of the two attacks
of four seconds.
5.2 Implementation
We have implemented our DDoS detection algorithm. The implementation evaluates how the
DDoS detection algorithm works in real environments. We show the setup and the results.
5.2.1 Setup
We program the DDoS detection algorithm that consists in an script in Python. Table 5-1
shows the parameter setting used in the implementation based on the results of the ana-
lytical evaluation. We simulate a simple topology using Mininet. Figure 5-11 shows the
topology. The topology consists in one controller, and three OpenFlow switches connected
to it. We connect four hosts to every OpenFlow switch simulating the user subnets. In
addition, we use the POX controller installed in the Mininet virtual machine as the SDN
controller. The flows are managed using the l2 learning program of POX controller and
the attacks are launched using a script in Python that we program that generates packets
using random headers to create new flows. The normal traffic is simulated using the ping
command of the hosts.
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We monitor the OpenFlow traffic during 510 seconds and execute the following DDoS attacks:
1. Attack 1: We evaluate the local perspective detection. We execute the script of the
attack during 1 second in the 30 seconds of the interval using the hosts 1 and 2.
2. Attack 2: We evaluate the local perspective detection. We execute the script of the
attack during 2 seconds in the 90 seconds of the interval using the hosts 1 and 4.
3. Attack 3: We evaluate the local perspective detection. We execute the script of the
attack during 4 seconds in the 150 seconds of the interval using the hosts 1, 4 and 7.
4. Attack 4: We evaluate the local perspective detection. We execute the script of the
attack during 10 seconds in the 210 seconds of the interval using the hosts 2, 5 and 8.
5. Attack 5: We evaluate the local perspective detection. We execute the script of the
attack during 20 seconds in the 270 seconds of the interval using the hosts 6.
6. Attack 6: We evaluate the local perspective detection. We execute the script of the
attack during 30 seconds in the 330 seconds of the interval using the hosts 1.
7. Attack 7: We evaluate the global perspective detection. We execute an attack using
the pingall command in Mininet to simulate a IpSweep attack inside the network. We
execute this attack during 15 seconds in the 390 seconds in the interval using all the
hosts.
8. Attack 8: We evaluate the global perspective detection. We modify the script of the
attack to send low rate of forged packets and execute the script during 40 seconds in
the 450 seconds of the interval using all hosts.
The DDoS attacks are executes using different hosts connected to a different OpenFlow
switches to evaluate the behavior of the algorithm comming from different OpenFlow switches.
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Figure 5-12: Results of the implementation.
5.2.2 Results
In this experiment, we achieved an accuracy of 99.62% with a 0.06% of false positives and
1.2% of false negatives detecting the eight attacks. Figure 5-12 shows the points where
the DDoS detection algorithm raise an alarm. Table 5-3 shows the individual results of
the implementation experiments. We analyze each attack to discover features of our DDoS
detection algorithm in a real environment. The attacks 1 to 6 evaluate the local perspective
detection. The DDoS detection algorithm does not detect the attacks 1 and 2. These attacks
are reflected in the false positive rate. The algorithm detects the attack 3 using the local
perspective detection and reports the hosts 1, 4 and 7 as the source of the DDoS traffic. The
attack 4 is detected and the algorithm reports that hosts 2, 5 and 8 are the sources of the
DDoS traffic. The attacks 5 and 6 are detected and the algorithm reports the hosts 6 and
1 as the source of the DDoS traffic for the attack 5 and 6, respectively. The attack 7 and 8
evaluates the global perspective detection of the DDoS detection algorithm. The algorithm
detects these two attacks but they are shown by the global perspective detection because
the source of the attacks are not detected by local perspective algorithm.
5.3 Sensibility analysis
We perform a sensibility analysis on the DDoS detection algorithm. The purpose of this
analysis is show the variability of the number of successive observations needed by the algo-
rithm to detect an attack. The number of successive observations needed to detect a DDoS
attack against SDN control plane affects the detection time of the algorithm because each
observation is performed in a 4t.
We perform the sensibility analysis as follows:
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Table 5-3: Individual results of the implementation experiments.
Experiment Perspective Detection Observation
Attack 1 Local Not detected Attack is not detected due
to the duration of the
attack
Attack 2 Local Not detected Attack is not detected due
to the duration of the
attack
Attack 3 Local Detected Hosts 1, 4 and 7 are
reported
Attack 4 Local Detected Hosts 2, 5 and 8 are
reported
Attack 5 Local Detected Host 1 is reported
Attack 6 Local Detected Host 6 is reported
Attack 7 Global Detected The source of the attack is
not reported
Attack 8 Global Detected The source of the attack is
not reported
5.3.1 Varying α and β.
We fix the values of λ1 and λ0 as 0.6 and 0.33, respectively. These values are chosen accord-
ing to the parameters setting defined in the Table 5-1. Then, we vary the values of α and β
between 0.05 and 0.5. The Figure 5-13 shows the variability of the number of successive
observations needed by the algorithm to detect an attack. The number of successive obser-
vations increases when α and β are closer to zero. The Figure 5-13 shows that the maximum
value the number of successive observations between 0.05 and 0.5 is 11 observations. This
means that the maximun time needed to detect a DDoS attack against SDN control plane
is around 11 times the value of 4t.
5.3.2 Varying λ1 and λ0.
We fix the values of α and β as 0.01 and 0.02, respectively. These values are chosen according
to the parameters setting defined in the Table 5-1. Then, we vary the value of λ1 between
0.5 and 0.7 and the value of λ0 between 0.4 and 0.5. We choose these intervals because the
DDoS detection algorithm consider that λ1 > λ0. The Figure 5-14shows the variability of
the number of successive observations needed by the algorithm to detect an attack. We find
that the number of successive observatios increases when the values of λ1 and λ0 are closer
between them and viceversa.
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Figure 5-13: Number of successive observations depending of the parameters α and β.




We analyze the time needed by the algorithm to detect an attack varying the value of 4t.We
fix the values of α, β, λ1 and λ0 as 0.01, 0.02, 0.6 and 0.33, respectively. These values are
chosen according to the defined parameters in the Table 5-1. According to the Figure 5-
13 and Figure 5-14, the DDoS detection algorithm using these parameters needs at least
7 successive observations to detect an DDoS attack against the SDN control plane. Each
successive observations is made in 4t. We conclude that our DDoS detection algorithm is
highly dependent of the parameter 4t because this value defines the detection time of the
algorithm. For example, we define the value of 4t as 0.5 seconds in our analytical evaluation
and this means that the algorithm need at least 3.5 seconds to detect an attack taking 7
successive observations of 4t.
5.4 Limitations
During the evaluation, we find some limitations presented in our DDoS detection algorithm.
First, the algorithm can not to detect attacks with a short time duration such as Smurf
which has a duration of one second. Second, the algorithm can not detect attacks with a
duration under the 3.5 seconds. The algorithm needs at least 7 successive observations to
detect an attack and this results in at least 3.5 seconds analyzing the successive observations.
If the attacker executes attacks with a duration under the 3.5 seconds such as Smurf, the
algorithm does not detect the attack and the controller can be overloaded.
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6 Conclusion
SDN can provide innovative solutions in network security. However, the security of SDN
architecture has not been widely addressed. SDN architectures that operate in reactive
mode could be very vulnerable to DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane. An attacker
can execute a DDoS attack against the SDN control plane by generating high number of
new flows. These new flows generate a high volume of Packet-In messages to the controller
causing a crash of the controller due to high resource consumption.
We propose the design of an algorithm to detect DDoS attacks against the SDN control plane.
We leverage the logical centralized control to monitor the OpenFlow traffic of the interfaces
of the OpenFlow switches and the aggregated OpenFlow traffic of the SDN communication
channel. We make the assumption that DDoS attacks against SDN control plane shows
an abrupt changes in the number of Packet-In messages during the time. Our algorithm
considers both the OpenFlow traffic coming from a specific interface of an OpenFlow switch
towards the control plane (local perspective detection) and the whole aggregated OpenFlow
traffic on the control channel (global perspective detection). In our evaluation, we achieved
a 99.94% of accuracy in detecting DDoS attacks against SDN control plane with a 0.04%
of false positives and 0.07% of false negatives. However, we identify some additional issues
that need to be improved. Our DDoS detection algorithm needs at least four seconds to
raise detection. An attacker can generate enough high volume of new flows during the first
four seconds of the attacks and crash the controller. In addition, attacks such as Portsweep
could not be detected if the attacker generates low number of flows and generate high false
negative rate.
For our future work, we will improve the false negative rate and the detection time of our
DDoS detection algorithm. We will explore the use of misuse detection techniques to create
signatures for Portsweep, Smurf and Neptune to make a quick detection of these attacks
that could be used to generate attacks against the SDN control plane.
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